Secure mm-Wave Communications with Imperfect Hardware and Uncertain
  Eavesdropper Location by Mashdour, Saeed et al.
 Secure mm-Wave Communications with Imperfect 
Hardware and Uncertain Eavesdropper Location 
 
1
Saeed Mashdour, Majid Moradikia, Phee Lep Yeoh 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the secrecy performance of millimeter-wave (mm-Wave) communications with 
imperfect hardware and uncertain eavesdropper location. We consider a multiple-antenna source 
communicating with a single-antenna destination using masked beamforming to transmit the information 
signals with artificial noise (AN) in the presence of a passive eavesdropper (Eve). For this system, we 
derive new expressions for the secrecy outage probability (SOP) and secrecy throughput with mm-Wave 
multipath propagation under slow-fading channel conditions and hardware imperfections. Based on this, 
optimal power allocation (OPA) solutions are derived for the information and AN signals aimed at 
minimizing the SOP and maximizing the secrecy throughput. Our results reveal that it is non-trivial to 
achieve an OPA solution for the general scenario of imperfect hardware. We also highlight that our 
proposed masked beamforming with OPA scheme significantly enhances the secrecy throughput compared 
with the benchmark schemes of maximal-ratio transmission and equal power allocation. 
 
Index Terms 
Physical Layer Security, Millimeter Wave Systems, Transceiver Hardware Imperfections, Optimal 
Power Allocation. 
1.    INTRODUCTION 
 
The ubiquity of wireless technology has led to an enormous amount of sensitive and confidential 
information being transmitted via the open wireless medium. Due to the randomness and broadcast nature 
of electromagnetic waves, the security of wireless communications conventionally implemented above the 
physical layer via key based cryptography [1] is becoming increasingly challenging. Recently, the so-called 
physical layer security (PLS) approach, in which the dynamic characteristics of wireless links are 
intelligently exploited has attracted significant attention in the literature [2], [3]. For instance, unmanned 
aerial vehicle (UAV) networks with covert communications for transmission with location uncertainty of 
the transmitter or receiver was considered in [4] such that the information is not detected by a ground 
warden. Also, PLS of a UAV network for transmission of confidential information from a base station to 
multiple receivers utilizing a UAV jammer in presence of multiple eavesdroppers (Eves) was studied in [5].  
PLS of overlay device-to-device untrusted relaying in the presence or absence of a friendly jammer was 
comprehensively analyzed in [6] and secrecy performance of cellular multi-user decode-and-forward based 
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 two-way relaying networks was investigated in [7] where a multi-antenna base station communicates bi-
directionally with several users by the aid of decode-and-forward relay(s) under the existence of a multi-
antenna passive eavesdropper. In recent years, massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems 
have come into prominence due to the significant performance gains in terms of security, spectral 
efficiency and energy saving [8], [9]. Typically, multiple antenna transmitters have been considered to 
transmit narrow directional beams towards the legitimate destination to increase the received signal power 
relative to the eavesdropper based on known channels state information (CSI) [10]. When the exact CSI of 
Eve is unknown, the transmitter can broadcast the information signal together with artificial noise (AN) to 
degrade Eve's channel [11]-[13]. The secrecy performance of AN-aided transmission has been investigated 
for both fast and slow-fading channels [12], [15]-[17]. For fast-fading channels, the channel coherence time 
is much shorter than the codeword length, thus beamforming and optimal power allocation (OPA) 
strategies are based on the ergodic secrecy rate (ESR) [12], [14]. However, in the case of slow-fading 
channels, outage-based formulations are more suitable. Along this line, the optimal power allocation (OPA) 
strategy towards the goal of the secrecy outage probability (SOP) minimization is studied in [16], [17]. In 
recent years, different literatures have used PLS in the context of high-frequency millimeter-wave (mm-
Wave) bands, i.e., 30-300 GHz, [18], [19], [21]-[25]. In [21], the ray-cluster channel model has been used 
which is known to accurately model the multipath propagation in mm-Wave systems. However, only the 
works of [18], [19], [22] have analyzed the PLS using the ray-cluster channel in mm-Wave communication 
systems. Another important consideration in wireless systems is the impact of hardware impairments [15], 
[26], due to I/Q imbalance, oscillator phase noise (PN), high power amplifier (HPA) nonlinearities and 
quantization errors. It was found in [29], [30] that even after applying transmitter calibration and 
compensation algorithms at the receiver, there still remains a combination of multiplicative PN and 
distortion noises at both the transmitter and receiver. Recently, the PLS design with imperfect hardware has 
been investigated in [15], [31], and [32] for microwave channels. For mm-Wave systems, the effect of 
imperfect hardware is intensified due to several reasons. Firstly, the high carrier frequency leads to larger 
multiplication factors which results in phase noise amplification. Also, a bank of phase shifters is needed to 
connect to high or massive number of antennas to control the hardware cost and power consumption. 
Furthermore, mm-Wave systems are more sensitive to angular mismatches due to strong directionality 
provided by large antenna numbers [33]. Thus, it is necessary to consider hardware imperfection in the 
design and analysis of mm-Wave communication systems. 
Millimeter wave systems are known to provide enhanced secrecy against eavesdroppers due to the 
directional signal beams from highly directional phased-array antennas. However, signal beam reflections 
from ambient reflectors and eavesdropping strategies using skillfully designed beam exploration have 
created significant possibilities for eavesdroppers to attack the confidential information [34], so that even 
only one eavesdropper could intercept transmitted signals successfully [35]. As such, we are motivated in 
this paper to consider the impact of eavesdropping in the PLS of mm-Wave systems using the ray-cluster 
model with imperfect hardware and slow-fading channels. To do so, we make the practical assumptions 
that exact CSI of Eve is unavailable, and the distortion noise follows a Gaussian distribution based on the 
aggregate contribution of multiple hardware impairments [36]. We assume Eve is randomly located and, 
based on the slow-fading assumption, there exists a suspicious eavesdropping region where Eve is likely to 
be located around the source and destination. For this system, we design a new secure AN masked 
beamforming and separately analyze the OPA aimed at SOP minimization and secrecy throughput 
maximization. The impact of hardware imperfection results in a more general expression for the mm-wave 
 OPA compared with the ideal hardware case considered in [18]. It is noted here that due to the larger free-
space loss and large number of the implemented antennas in mm-Wave wireless communication systems, 
perfect knowledge of CSI is difficult to achieve. In such situations, beam training via spatial scanning is a 
common approach to achieve large beamforming gains by adaptive aligning of the transmitter and the 
receiver beams. Spatial scanning utilizes exhaustive and hierarchical search strategies through the 
codebooks that cover the scanning space to determine the best beam which aligns with the dominant paths 
for communications [37]-[39]. The main contributions of the paper are summarized as follows: 
 The generalized system model for transceiver hardware imperfections is detailed after presenting 
the discrete angular domain channel model for our mm-wave system constructed by spatially 
resolvable paths. 
 We derive the signal-to-noise-plus-distortion ratios (SNDRs) at the Eve and the legitimate 
destination with secure AN masked beamforming. We also discuss the impact of hardware 
imperfections in the high-SNR regime. 
 We derive a new closed-form expression for the SOP of mm-wave systems with AN and imperfect 
hardware when the exact eavesdropper location is unknown. Based on this, we formulate the OPA 
factor between the source and the destination such that the SOP is minimized. 
 We also derive the OPA which maximizes the secrecy throughput under a SOP constraint. We also 
present high SNR analysis to identify the impact of hardware imperfection on the secrecy 
performance and OPA. 
 We show in our analytical and experimental results that imperfect hardware results in more power 
allocated to the AN signal to boost the secrecy of the system. We also show that the secrecy 
performance with AN is improved in comparison with traditional maximum ratio transmitting 
(MRT) beamforming. 
Our derived solutions characterize the decrease in secrecy performance of mm-wave systems with 
imperfect hardware compared to the ideal hardware case. We also highlight that AN beamforming can 
protect against eavesdropper interception in mm-wave systems with imperfect hardware. 
 
2.     SIGNAL AND SYSTEM MODEL 
In this section, we detail the mm-Wave channel model, transceiver hardware imperfections and dynamic 
on-off transmission scheme considered in our system model. We assume a multi-antenna source ( ) 
equipped with an array of   antennas communicates with a single antenna destination ( ), while a single 
antenna Eve ( ) attempts to eavesdrop the transmitted information. We assume that instantaneous CSI of   
is perfectly known at   but the CSI of   is unknown. We consider slow-fading in which the complex 
channel gains in a single frame are unchanged although they change independently from one frame to 
another.  
2.1.  Ray-cluster channel model 
Due to the sparse scattering and multipath propagation, the mm-Wave channel is well-modeled using a ray-
cluster based spatial model, where the channel is represented by multiple clusters each of which comprises 
several paths. Since it is possible to concentrate the mm-Wave transmission power in a particular cluster, 
the channel is assumed to have a single cluster. We apply a discrete angular domain channel (DADC) 
 model for the spatially resolvable multipaths [18], [20] where the angular domain at a fixed angular spacing 
of 
 
 
 is uniformly sampled at the transmitter. The length of the mm-Wave transmit antenna array is denoted 
by   
 
 
 which determines the angular domain resolvability. Antenna spacing is also denoted by   
 
 
  
where   is the wavelength. Then, the DADC model can be represented by a unitary matrix        
whose columns form an orthogonal basis of the transmitted signal space defined as  
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where   [             ] is the complex channel gain vector. If    [                ],    is 
considered as a complex Gaussian coefficient with zero mean and unit variance, otherwise it will be zero. 
We also denote   as the average path loss between the transmitter and the receiver, and   as number of the 
spatially resolvable paths (   ).  Based on (2),    √
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    and     channels respectively, where    and    are the corresponding path losses,     
    
and     
    denote the relevant complex gains,    and    are numbers of spatially resolvable paths in 
the destination and the eavesdropper channels with     ,     . The basis vectors of the destination 
and eavesdropper are denoted by     for            and     for           , respectively. As shown 
in Fig. 1, the destination’s resolvable paths are selected from the set 
   {   |     
      [   ]               } while the eavesdropper’s resolvable path are selected 
from the set    {   |     
      [   ]               }. We denote the common paths of   and 
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           and           , the corresponding complex channel gain vectors are defined as 
 ̂   (     )   
    ,  ̌   (     )   
      ,  ̂   (     )   
    ,  ̌   (     )  
       , as well. It is also noted that based on the intuitive results brought in [18], we can reasonably 
assume that        and       . Since     and    are uncorrelated and independent due to Gaussian 
distribution, we can also assume that  ̂  and  ̂  are uncorrelated and independent vectors.  
 2.2.  Transceiver hardware imperfection 
Fig. 2 shows the statistical behavior of imperfect hardware at node   {   }. We consider the ideal 
eavesdropper case, corresponding to the worst-case condition in terms of secrecy performance, where   
does not have any hardware impairments. The distortion noises     and    , respectively appeared at the 
transmitter of   and receiver of   as a consequence of hardware imperfection, causes  a mismatch between 
the desired and the actual transmitted signal. This noise is well-modeled by a Gaussian distributed random 
variable.  We consider the same model as [31] where the variance of the distortion noise at the  th node is 
proportional to the signal power at the corresponding antenna. Accordingly 
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where        is the transmitted signal vector. The design parameters     and    , so-called error vector 
magnitudes (EVM), characterize the level of imperfections in the transmitter and receiver hardware, 
respectively. EVM determines the quality of RF transceivers and is defined as the ratio of the average 
distortion magnitude to the average signal magnitude. Notably, the EVM measures the joint effect of 
different hardware imperfections and compensation algorithms and thus it can be measured directly in 
practice [15], [31]. 3GPP LTE has EVM requirements in the range of    ,     [          ], where 
smaller values are needed to achieve higher spectral efficiencies. 
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Figure 1  Model of propagation paths 
 2.3.  Dynamic on-off transmission 
To address the AN and MRT (as a special case of AN) cases in our slow-fading scenario, we adopt an on-
off transmission protocol [17] at the source based on having the instantaneous CSI at the destination and no 
CSI of the eavesdropper. In the on-off transmission scheme, the transmitter decides to transmit or not based 
on its knowledge of the receiver's channel so that the transmitter decides when to transmit according to the 
instantaneous CSI of the destination to prevent undesirable transmissions which incur capacity outages 
(     ) or unacceptably high risk of secrecy outage (     ) where    is the codeword rate,    is the 
redundancy rate required to decode the confidential information [40],    and    denote the instantaneous 
received SINRs,        (    ) and        (    ) are the channel capacity of the destination and 
eavesdropper respectively. According to [16], our on-off transmission scheme is an adaptive scheme where 
the encoder adaptively selects the transmitted codeword rate   , according to the instantaneous CSI of the 
destination's channel. In this scheme, the destination only needs to send its instantaneous SNR    to the 
transmitter.    is arbitrarily set close to    which is the largest possible rate without incurring any decoding 
error at the destination. Let   ‖ ̃ ‖
  represents the overall channel gain of the destination, i.e.,    ̂  
 ̌ where  ̂  ‖ ̂ ‖
 ,  ̌  ‖ ̌ ‖
  are the instantaneous gains of the common and non-common paths, 
respectively. Therefore, the source transmits only when   ( ̂  ̌)     is in the transmission region 
  { |      } satisfying the transmission constraint       where          is the confidential 
information rate for a given source codebook. 
 
3.     SECURE ARTIFICIAL NOISE MASKED BEAMFORMING 
We propose a secure artificial noise masked beamforming scheme based on the slow-fading SNDR at the 
destination. With hardware impairments, it is typically assumed that the distortion noise benefits the system 
security by degrading the received SNDR at  . However, in our ray-cluster channel model, the distortion is 
an isotropically distributed spatial noise and affects all paths at both   and  . As previously mentioned, we 
assume that while perfect CSI of the destination is known, the exact CSI of the eavesdropper is unavailable 
at the source. Therefore, in the beamforming transmission design, we assume that partial CSI of the 
eavesdropper channel should be estimated based on the slow-fading assumption where the exact location of 
the eavesdropper is unknown but there exists an eavesdropping region around the source and destination.  
Therefore, we propose to improve the secrecy performance by transmitting artificial interference towards 
the eavesdropper’s resolvable paths which do not include the    common paths that overlap with the main 
channel. As such, a mixed version of information bearing signal and AN is transmitted such that the AN 
signal is in the null space of the destination’s resolvable paths to guarantee not to interfere with the 
destination's paths. 
Remark 1 (i.i.d. Rayleigh fading channel): In typical wireless systems with statistically independent 
Rayleigh fading channels, if the source has no knowledge of the eavesdropper situation, the AN is 
broadcasted in the null space of the legitimate channel which is known at  . This null space calculation 
involves the singular value decomposition (SVD) whose complexity is significantly increased by large 
number of transmit antennas [16]. However, as discussed above, in our case, specific propagation 
characteristic of mm-Wave channels assist us to transmit AN towards the eavesdropper's resolvable paths 
excluding the    common paths with the destination.■ 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let   represent the unit power information signal, i.e.,  [| | ]   . As such, the signal vector transmitted 
by   in our proposed scheme is   √      √
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   where   is total transmitted power,    
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]          with  {   }        representing the AN 
beamforming matrix designed to null out the jamming signal  {   }        at   i.e.,      . The 
power allocation factor   [   ]  determines the power ratio for the information signal and the AN. 
Interestingly, substituting    , MRT beamformer is achieved. Using the above definition, the masked 
beamforming matrix   is acquired by only choosing specific columns from   correspoding to   . 
According to Fig. 2, the received signals at   and   are 
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where    and    are i.i.d. additive white Gaussian noise with zero-mean and variance   
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 ). According to (4) and (5) after simple algebraic manipulations, the 
SNDR at   and   can be respectively formulated as 
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  are both Gaussian and independent, we have      ( ) as stated in [20]. We also define 
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  ‖  with        (      ) and the term    
   therein is equivalent to  ̌ . It should also 
be remarked here that,   and   are independent because      and      and        .   
Remark 2: (High-SNR Regime): To gain deeper insights, we consider (6) and (7) in the high transmit SNR 
regime.  When the transmit power   is sufficiently large, we find that     
  approaches a constant ceiling 
 
Figure 2 Block diagram of the system model with imperfections at the source and the destination 
 
     
  
 
    
  which only depends on the EVMs at the nodes, while the information leaked towards   
significantly depends on the power allocation factor  . This reveals that choosing   is crucial for 
guaranteeing secrecy in our considered network. In addition, it is not possible to achieve some target 
secrecy rates due to the ceiling defined above, no matter how much large the value of transmit power  . ■ 
Remark 4: (Ideal Hardware-Masked Beaforming): For the special assumption of ideal hardware at the 
nodes, the SNDRs calculated in (6) and (7) can be simplified to the received SNRs in [18], [22] given by 
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(   )        
                                                              ( ) 
Comparing (8), (9) with (6), (7), it can be clearly seen that the terms    and     in (6) and (7), respectively, 
contribute to a more complicated expression for the non-ideal hardware SNDRs. Based on (6), (7), we see 
that the distortion noises emitted by   results in interference at both   and  , while the self-distortion noise 
at   only degrades the received SNDR at the legitimate destination. Thus, even though hardware 
imperfection can intrinsically confuse passive eavesdroppers, the secrecy performance is still degraded. ■ 
it is also worthy of mention that the eavesdropper’s SNDR in both cases of ideal and non-ideal hardware, 
which were derived respectively in (7) and (9), is calculated based on the fact that     
   ̂  ̂ 
  which is 
only achieved when the  th path is chosen from the common set   , i.e.,     ,       
 ≠  . If there are no 
common paths between   and  , i.e.,     , the array steering vectors within  ̃  and  ̃  will be 
orthogonal, resulting in     
   . Thus, it can be concluded that in the situation of     , the secrecy 
can be effectively guaranteed by using a simple beamformer which has low implementation complexity in 
contrast to other complicated precoder techniques at the multi-antenna transmitter.  
It is also worthy of mention that if    is increased,  ̂ in both the numerator and denominator of     
  will 
increase. Thus, increasing the number of common paths between   and   results in more information 
likely to be leaked towards   and a higher amount of distortion noise due to imperfection injected into   . 
Therefore, unlike the perfect hardware case where the intercept probability is optimistically assumed to be 
only affected by the relationship between spatially resolvable paths of   and  , we highlight that the level 
of hardware imperfections can significantly influence the secrecy performance. 
The secrecy performance is evaluated from two perspectives. In section 4, the primary design objective is 
to minimize the SOP. To do so, a closed form expression for the SOP is obtained and the optimal power 
allocation factor     
  is derived through minimizing the SOP. In the second approach presented in Section 
5, the OPA that maximizes the throughput    
  subject to a maximum permissible SOP constraint is derived. 
 
4.     SOP ANALYSIS AND THE CORRESPONDING OPA STRATEGY 
With the on-off transmission strategy described in Section 2, the SOP is expressed as 
      {        |   } for a fixed rate    based on a common codebook at   and  . Utilizing on-
off transmission, the source stops transmissions unless the instantaneous destination’s channel gain   
exceeds the threshold   which is determined relying on the conditions of the transmission region  . Thus, 
to guarantee a positive    against the eavesdropper the minimum value for the power allocation factor is 
 determined according to the transmission region described in dynamic on-off transmission, where,     
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In order to examine (11), we derive the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of     
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Proof: From the definition of CDF we have 
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Now, given (11) the SOP is given by  
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Our new expression in (18) generalizes the SOP expression derived for the ideal hardware case in [18]. It 
should be remarked that, since we use on-off transmission scheme with regard to the fact that          
we have to consider two further cases for the SOP. Therefore, the cases of      with    
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 , should be taken into account where   stops transmitting if one of these conditions holds 
true. From the practical point of view, the condition       implies that unlike perfect hardware situation 
where the design parameter    is independent of transceivers hardware qualities, in our  generalized 
considered case,    should be determined in accordance with the aggregate level of impairments imposed 
on the whole network, before the data transmission. Then, even if     , the source node examines the 
overall destination’s channel feedback to determine if the constraint   
 ̅
  (      
  ̅)
 (or equivalently 
  
     
       
    ( )) is satisfied and full power is assigned for AN transmission (i.e.,    ) or the source 
totally suspends its transmission.  
Based on what was discussed above together with (17), finally the overall SOP is derived as  
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where the SOP is 1 for target secrecy rates above a threshold determined by the imperfection of the nodes, 
i.e.,    . When     , the SOP approaches zero with increasing  . Our result is different from the ideal 
hardware scenario in which the SOP, regardless to any target secrecy rate, always approaches zero with 
increasing SNR [18], [41]. 
Based on (19),    ( 
  ) is attained by substituting the OPA factor     
 , which minimizes the SOP in (17). 
From (19) it can be inferred that if the predefined target secrecy level satisfies      , the OPA that 
minimizes the SOP can be derived. Minimizing the instantaneous SOP, with respect to the power allocation 
factor   yields the optimum value     
  as follows 
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The minimization of    ( ) is equivalent to minimizing    
 ( ). However, because of the complicated 
mathematical structure of    
 ( ), it is non-trivial to simply investigate the monotonicity of    ( ). As an 
alternative solution, since we have    ( )    {    (
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 monotonically increasing function, the minimization of     is equivalent to the maximization of  ( )  
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Substituting     
  and     , which was earlier obtained respectively in (6) and (7),  ( ) can be 
reformulated as 
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where    (   )(     ) ,    (   )(    )       ,           ,     (      
  ) and       (    )          . To obtain optimal points of   ( ) over  , we first investigate 
the convexity of  ( ). To do so, the first derivative of  ( ) with respect to the   is given by 
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where             ,       (     ) and      (     ). Since the denominator is always 
positive, we can readily find that the sign of 
  ( )
  
 follows that of the numerator  ( )     
        . In 
other words, examining the sign of  ( ) is sufficient to investigate the monotonicity of  ( ). Now, relying 
on corollary 1 in [15] together with the sign of  ( ) at the boundaries        and    , the following 
proposition is presented to solve the maximization of  ( ) in (21). 
Proposition 1: Based on the sign of  ( ) at the boundaries        and    ,  ( ) may be convex, 
concave or it is possible to be neither convex nor concave in the feasible set   (      ]. Following this 
fact, the optimal point is given by  
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where    
   (     √          ) (   )⁄  and   
   (    √          ) (   )⁄  are the zero-
crossing points of  ( ). The operator  { (  )} is defined as a function which extracts the point    
corresponding to     (  ). Please refer to Appendix A for the proof. 
 
5.     SECRECY THROUGHPUT ANALYSIS AND CORRESPONDING OPA STRATEGY  
In the previous section, we assume that the code rates are fixed and do not vary with  . In this section, a 
different approach is considered where the power allocation factor   is optimized for different code rates, 
i.e., the transmission code rate    and source code rate    are adapted for each channel realization of  . 
This leads to a higher throughput compared to the previous scheme at the expense of higher complexity. 
Hence, in this second approach the code rates    and    are potentially functions of  , i.e.,   ( ) and 
  ( ). Based on on-off transmission scheme, when    , the average secrecy throughput is defined as 
    {  ( )} while in the case of     we have   ( )    [12]. Our aim is to maximize the 
throughput under a maximum tolerable SOP constraint. To do so, the maximization of  , which is 
equivalent to the maximization of   ( ) for each destination’s channel realization, is accomplished over 
 the parameters    and power allocation factor   to satisfy the requirement on the SOP, i.e.,    ( )   . 
The throughput optimization problem is formulated as 
 
   
             ( )      
                       ( )    ( )     
              ( )                      
                                      
                                                  (25) 
where the first constraint guarantees to have a reliable link to the intended receiver i.e., corresponding 
transmission region of the second OPA strategy. The second condition imposes secrecy constraint in which 
the parameter       is a predefined threshold that indicates the maximum tolerable SOP. The third 
condition is the power allocation constraint. By relaxing the optimization problem (25), it can be rewritten 
as follows, whereas the derivation is relegated to Appendix B. 
   
           ( )      
       
 
    
  ( )         
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where  ( )  
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 and   ( ) is given by 
  ( )      (
      
 
    ( )
)      (
 (   )   
    ( )   ( ( )   )   
)                                  (  ) 
Notably, the transmission region constraint     { |
 
    
  ( )} in (26) implies that   only  transmits 
when this condition is satisfied.  
To solve the maximization problem in (26), we have to first investigate the behavior of  ( ). Using (16) 
and the definition of  ( ), the equation       (  ( ))      can be reformulated as follows 
 ( )     ( 
 ( )
     ( )
) [  
(   ) ( )
     ( )
]
     
                                  (  ) 
where  ( ) is a monotonically increasing function in the feasible set      , (See Appendix C for the 
proof). From (28) the maximum value of  ( ), denoted by     , is attained when     as 
      ( )      ( ) (     ( ))⁄                                            (  ) 
where  ( ) is a monotonically decreasing function of   (please refer to Appendix D for the proof). Thus, 
 (   )            . Also,      is acquired as 
      (    )   
  ( )
  (   )  ( ) [  (   )
  ( )
  (   )  ( )
]
 (    )
                   (  ) 
In the above equation,  
  ( )
  (   )  ( )     ( )   . Thus,       [  (   )
  ( )
  (   )   ( )
]
 (     )
   
 . We can easily conclude that  ( ) has a unique zero crossing point. Applying the bisection method we 
can find a value   which is the zero crossing point of  ( ) within the range [      ] for a given  . To 
 start bisection method, upper and lower bound of   are considered as [     ]  [      ]. To solve (26), 
optimal value of   should be found such that    is maximized. The optimal value of   is derived for two 
cases of   ( ).  
Case 1)   ( ) is a concave function of  . In this case, the optimal value is given by 
   
  {
                        
            
                                                                    (  ) 
where    is the unique root of the following equation  
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Case 2)    ( ) is a non-concave function of  . In this case, the optimal value is given by 
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where,   ,   
  and    are discussed in Appendix E. Therefore,    
  could be obtained using bisection method. 
As such,   only transmits when      . Otherwise,   keeps silent to guarantee a positive    and the only 
power allocation factor which could meet the transmission condition is the optimal power allocation that 
maximizes   ( ). Therefore, the maximum secrecy throughput is defined as 
  ∬      ( )  ̌ ̂(   )
 
   
                                                        (  ) 
where      ( ) is the maximized secrecy rate for    
  and   ̌ ̂(   ) is the joint probability density 
function (pdf) of  ̌ and  ̂. Since    and    have no common path,    ̌ ̂(   ) could be replaced by  
  ̌( )    ̂( ). Similar to what is mentioned for   in section 3.2,  ̂      (    ) and 
 ̌      (      ). Therefore, (34) can be rewritten as  
  ∬      ( )  ̌( )  ̂( )
 
   
                                                        (  ) 
where   ̌( )  
          
(      ) 
 and   ̂( )  
        
(    ) 
. The secrecy throughput for MRT beamforming can be 
derived as a special case with     and        given in (29).  Thus,      ( ) with MRT 
beamforming is derived as 
      ( )      (
  
 
   
  
    
      
)                                                               (  ) 
Redefining    ̅
 ̂
 ̂  ̌
,    ̅
 ̂
 ̂  ̌
,    ̅( ̂   ̌) and    ̅( ̂   ̌), the secrecy rate in (36) can be re-
expressed as 
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The transmission region for this case is { | ̌   }, where   is 
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Please refer to Appendix F for the proof. 
Accordingly, the maximum secrecy throughput for MRT plan is derived as 
  ∫ ∫
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According to [42, 4.337.5], the above integral becomes as 
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]. Please 
refer to Appendix G for the proof. 
To obtain a deeper insight, we proceed to investigate the secrecy throughput in High-SNR Regime. To do 
so, we consider the ideal hardware SNR in (8) and the definition of   ( ) in (27). As such, the secrecy rate 
is derived as 
  
 ( )      (
   
     ( )
)                                                               (  ) 
where       
  
 
    
 . Since   
 ( )   , the upper bound of   ( ) is acquired as     
  
 
 
. Using (9) 
and (12) we can conclude that 
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Using a similar process to (28),   (  ) is derived as 
  (  )  [  
(   )  ( )
      ( )
]
     
                                               (  ) 
where   ( ) is a monotonically increasing function in the feasible set      , (Appendix H). 
Regarding (41) and its first derivative with respect to   which is equal to  
 
   
 
  ( )  
   ( )
  
     ( )
   and the 
monotonically increasing   ( ) with respect to  , we can conclude that   
 ( ) is monotonically decreasing 
with  . Thus, maximum secrecy rate at high-SNRs occurs for small  . This result states that most of the 
power   should be allocated to AN signal while the remaining of the power is dedicated to the source for 
signal transmission. This is equivalent to the case where most of the power is allocated to AN in (18) where 
  is very close to zero. Therefore, in high-SNR regime it is not easily possible for the eavesdropper to 
intercept the transmitted signal and therefore signal transmission is performed in most secure state.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3  SOP versus 𝑁𝐶  for different levels of hardware imperfections (𝑘𝑡𝑥  𝑘𝑟𝑥  𝑘) with 𝑀     , 
𝑃   𝑑𝐵𝑚, 𝑅𝑠   𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠/𝑠/𝐻𝑧, 𝑁𝐷     and 𝒹𝐷     𝑚 
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 6. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
In this section, numerical illustrations are presented to verify the accuracy of the analytical results. The 
transmitter is considered to be a linear array with antenna spacing of half wavelength. The path loss is 
modelled as  (  )            ( ) according to experimental results in [21] and the noise power is 
set to   
      dBm. In this model,   is the distance in meters,    and    were measured at the carrier 
frequency of 28 GHz as 61.4 and 2 respectively. For comparison of the systems with perfect (   ) and 
imperfect hardware and also to investigate the imperfection level effect on the secrecy performance, we 
have considered two values of EVM as        and       which lies within the range mentioned in 
[27, Sec. 14.3.4] and also implemented in [28]. Transmitter is considered to be a ULA with antenna spacing 
half wavelength and the destination is located at          from the source transmitter. 
Fig. 3 compares the SOP of MRT and AN beamforming for different hardware imperfection levels and 
different numbers of common paths   . An eavesdropper is located at a distance          from the 
transmitter and   is set to 100. We can draw three conclusions based on what is observed in this figure. 
First, SOP is increased when    increases. The reason is that increasing the number of common paths, the 
eavesdropper will have more opportunities to intercept information from the received signal to the 
destination. Second, increasing the imperfection level brings about a higher SOP. This is because the 
imperfection has a higher impact on the received SNDR at the destination compared to the eavesdropper 
which results in a higher eavesdropping probability. Third, AN beamforming significantly outperforms 
MRT because AN provides effective interference at the eavesdropper which makes it more advantageous 
for security. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4  SOP versus 𝑁𝐶  for different secrecy rates and hardware imperfection levels 𝑘𝑡𝑥  𝑘𝑟𝑥      with 
𝑃   𝑑𝐵𝑚, 𝑁𝐷     and 𝒹𝐷     𝑚 
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 Fig. 4 shows the SOP versus    for different amounts of secrecy rate. It is shown that as    increases, the 
difference between SOP of the perfect and imperfect hardware becomes larger. It is further noted that for 
        / /   the system with imperfect hardware is always in secrecy outage which causes the 
communication to be  insecure. This agrees with our analytical results in (20) which explains that the 
system is in complete secrecy outage for the derived threshold.  
In Fig. 5, we plot the optimal power allocation     
  for different hardware imperfection levels and transmit 
powers  . The plot shows that     
  decreases with higher imperfection levels resulting in more AN 
transmitted at the source. We also see that     
  decreases with increasing  , which means that more AN 
signals should be transmitted when the information signal is successfully decoded at the destination.  
Fig. 6 plots the secrecy throughput in terms of transmission power  . It is reasonable that increasing the 
transmission power results in higher secrecy throughput. However, as previously mentioned, hardware 
imperfection reduces the SNDR at the destination more than the eavesdropper which results in a lower 
secrecy throughput compared with the ideal hardware case. For further comparison, we have included the 
baseline performance of equal power allocation between the useful signal and artificial noise. The figure 
clearly shows that the optimal power allocation can achieve significantly higher secrecy throughput 
especially in the imperfect hardware scenario. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5  OPA versus 𝑃 for different levels of hardware imperfections (𝑘𝑡𝑥  𝑘𝑟𝑥  𝑘) with 𝑀     , 𝒹𝐷     𝑚, 
𝑅𝑠   𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠/𝑠/𝐻𝑧 and 𝑁𝐷      
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Figure 6  Secrecy throughput in terms of 𝑃 for perfect and imperfect hardware, with 𝑀     , 𝒹𝐷     𝑚, 𝑁𝐷     
, 𝑁𝐶     and 𝜀      . 
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Figure 7  Optimal power allocation factor that maximizes secrecy throughput in terms of 𝑃 for perfect and 
imperfect hardware with 𝑀     , 𝒹𝐷     𝑚, 𝑁𝐷     and 𝜀       
 Fig. 7 plots the optimal power allocation factor    
  that maximizes the secrecy throughput for perfect and 
imperfect hardware cases. When the transmission power   is very low, the power allocation factor is one 
because all the power should be dedicated to the information signal. By increasing  , the transmission link 
is guaranteed and therefore a reduction in    
  means that the allocated power to AN increases to interfere 
with the eavesdropper. By comparing these two cases, we see that increasing hardware imperfection leads 
to a decrease in    
  compared with ideal case. Thus, more power should be dedicated to AN to interfere 
with the eavesdropper and hence improve the secrecy performance of the system with imperfect hardware. 
In addition, when   is high enough,  we can observe that    
  approaches zero as discussed in Section 5 for 
the high SNR regime. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
In high rate mm-wave communications systems, physical transceiver hardware imperfections can create a 
remarkable distortion in the emitted and received signals. This paper examined the presence of hardware 
imperfections in mm-wave systems with multiple transmit antennas and slow-fading channels. The SOP 
and secrecy throughput is derived assuming on-off transmission and no knowledge of the eavesdropper 
CSI. Our results concluded that hardware imperfections and the number of common propagation paths can 
substantially decrease the secrecy performance. Optimal power allocation (OPA) solutions are derived to 
minimize the SOP and maximize the secrecy throughput. Simulation results highlight that the optimal 
power allocation factor varies according to the level of hardware imperfections which confirm the validity 
of our derived analytical results. 
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APPENDIX A: 
Three conditions have to be met for  ( ) to be considered as a concave function in the feasible set 
(      ](               [  ]): i) 
  ( )
  
|
      
  , ii) 
  ( )
  
|
   
  , iii) There is only one maximum in 
the interval (      ]. 
On the other hand, as discussed before, the positivity/negativity of 
  ( )
  
 depends only on the numerator 
 ( ). Along this line, by plugging the boundaries        and     into  ( ) we can find that the sign 
of both  ( ) and  (    ) is unknown in the range of possible values of coefficients   |   
 . Thus, the 
following conclusions can be drawn for  ( )  
i. If   ( )  (    )   , it is expected for  ( ) to be neither convex nor concave as can be seen in 
Fig.8 (A) and Fig.8 (B). Moreover, both roots of  ( ) lie within the range of feasible set. So, in this 
situation the maximum of  ( ) may happen at        or     or possibly at   
    
  (   ) 
which denote the roots of  ( ) in the range of feasible set. The OPA factor     
  is selected by 
comparing  (    )  (  
 )  (  
 )     ( ). 
ii. If  (    )    ,  ( )    we expect for  ( ) to be a convex function as can be illustrated in Fig.8 
(C). Here, the maximum of  ( ) occurs at        or     and the OPA factor     
  is chosen by 
comparing  (    )     ( ).  
iii. Finally if  (    )    &  ( )   . In this situation, as shown in Fig. 8 (D), given that only 
    
    
  lies within the feasible set and the other root is outside of this interval, the corrolary 1 in 
[15] holds true and it can be found that  ( ) is a concave function in the feasible set. 
APPENDIX B: 
From the definition of     we have  
      {        }    {     
          }          ( 
       )                 (B1) 
Using the constraint       and defining  ( )  
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, we have  
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Furthermore, since we have      , the upper bound of    is acquired as  
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 Having     
  in (6), we can reformulate (  ) given by 
  ( )      (
 (   )   
    ( )   ( ( )   )   
)                                                     (  ) 
On the other hand to achieve positive secrecy rate, i.e.,   ( )   , the node   transmits signal when   
satisfies the transmission region’s constraint     
    ( ), resulting in transmission constraint as 
 
    
 
 ( ). 
 
APPENDIX C: 
The first order derivative of  ( ) with respect to   is calculated as below using the derivation criterion for 
implicit functions 
  
  
  
  
  ⁄
  
  ⁄
  
  ( )
  ( )
  
   
   (      (   ) )       (   
    )(     )
(      (   ) )      (     )(   )
            (  ) 
Note that,      ,  ,  ,    
  are positive variables. Additionally, to investigate the positivity/negativity of the 
term (     ) appeared in both the numerator and denominator, we obtain its lower bound by inserting 
     
 
    
 therein as follows.  
              
     
 
    
⇒                (
     
   
     
    
)                             (  ) 
Thus the denominator is always positive, i.e.,   ( )   , and it can be easily found that the sign of 
  
  
 
follows that of the term (   
    ) in the numerator   ( ). On the other hand, for practical values of 
        
 , and     we always have 
 
   
       in the feasible set   [   ]. Therefore, the case   
 
   
  
cannot occur in practice and the term (   
    ) will be always negative. Based on abovementioned 
discussion, it is easy to examine that   ( ) for practical values of different parameters therein is always 
negative, being responsible for the fact that   is monotonically increasing function of  , i.e.,  
  
  
  . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8  Graphical representations of all possible cases of 𝜙(𝜏) versus 𝜏. Case I is illustrated in (A) and (B). Case II and Case III 
have been respectively, illustrated in (C) and (D). 
 
 APPENDIX D: 
Since    is monotonically increasing by  ,      is obtained for    . In addition, from (28) we know that, 
 ( (   ))   . Thus,  
 ( (   ))   
 
 ( )
    ( )[ ]           
      
       
                           (  ) 
But, 
  
  
 is 
 
  
  
 
  
(     ) 
  
 
     [  
(   ) 
     
]
 (    )
  
 (    ) 
 
 
     [  
(   ) 
     
]
 (    )  
(   )                     (  ) 
From APPENDIX C, we know that (     )   . Accordingly, using (  ) it is easily concluded that 
  
  
  . 
 
APPENDIX E: 
Based on (27) and Proposition 1, we have           (
    
  ( )  
). Thus, 
   
  
 
 
   
(
 
(    )( (   )  )
 
   
  
  
    
). But, 
   
   
  and in turn 
    
   
 are very convoluted terms and the convexity of   and    with respect to   
is not straightforward to analyze mathematically. Thus, we proceed to consider the following cases. First, 
   
  
 
 
   
(   ) for    . Since 
 
    
  ( ), then     and hence 
   
  
  ,    . Therefore,    is a 
nonconvex function of   in the interval      . If 
    
   
  , then    is a concave function of the  . 
When     , which is equivalent with            ( ) (     ( ))⁄ , 
   
  
  is 
 
   
  
 
 
(   )(     )
 
(      )      (  
     
       )
  (   )   
                        (  ) 
 
In this case in which    is a concave function of  , if 
   
  
   for     , then maximum of    will occur at 
    . If 
   
  
   for     , then    will have an extremum at the root of the equation 
   
  
  . When    is 
non-concave, depending on sign of 
   
  
 at     and based on Fig. 9, two possible cases are 
   
  
   and 
   
  
    for    . Therefore, maximum amount of   ( ) is 
     ( )  {
   (  (  )   ( ))                     
   (  (  
 )   (  ))                   
                               (  )  
Hence,      could be derived as (33). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX F: 
    { |
 
    
  }  { |
 ̅( ̂   ̌)
 ̅( ̂   ̌)   
  }                                   (  ) 
For MRT plan,     and             ( ) (     ( ))⁄ . Therefore, 
 ̅( ̂  ̌)
 ̅( ̂  ̌)  
   becomes as 
 
 ̅( ̂   ̌)
 ̅( ̂   ̌)   
 
  ̅
 ̂    
 ̂   ̌
   ̅
 ̂    
 ̂   ̌
 
  ̅ ̂    
 ̂   ̌   ̅ ̂    
                                      (  ) 
From (  ) we can conclude that  
 
 ̌   ̌ ( ̂ (   ̅     
 ̅ ̅
 ̅
   ))   ̂ (   ̅     
 ̅ ̅
 ̅
   )  
 ̅
 ̅
 ̂                      (  ) 
(  ) is similar to             where   is substituted by  ̌,    by  ̂ (   ̅     
 ̅ ̅
 ̅
   ) and    by 
 ̂ (   ̅     
 ̅ ̅
 ̅
   )  
 ̅
 ̅
 ̂   . Since  ̌  ‖ ̌ ‖
  is positive, deriving the roots of the equation    
       for substituted  ,    and   , we can conclude that (  ) holds for the case of (38). 
 
APPENDIX G: 
Defining variable  ̅     , (39) becomes as 
∫ ∫
  ( ̅  )( ̅   )      
(      ) 
 
 
 
 
  ̂( )     
( ( ̅   )    (   ̅    )) (( ̅   ̅)(( ̅   )    )   )
( ̅(( ̅   )    )   )(( ̅   )   (  ( ̅   ̅)   ))
     
(G1) 
 
Figure 9  Graphical representations of all possible cases of   (𝜏) versus 𝜏 when   (𝜏) is non-concave. (A) represents case 1 
in which  
𝑑𝑅𝑠
𝑑𝜏
   for 𝜏   . (B) case 2 in which 
𝑑𝑅𝑠
𝑑𝜏
   for 𝜏   . 
 
 we can replace     
( ( ̅  )   (   ̅    ))(( ̅  ̅)(( ̅  )   )  )
( ̅(( ̅  )   )  )(( ̅  )  (  ( ̅  ̅)   ))
 by 
 
   
[  (   )    (  )    (  )    (  )  
  (  )] in which      
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( ̅  ̅)
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 ̅ and    
[   (   ̅    )][( ̅  ̅)(   )  ]
[   (  ( ̅  ̅)   )][ ̅(   )  ]
.  Also ( ̅   )       ∑ (      
 
)          ̅ 
      
   . 
Thus, (G1) is rewritten as 
  
 
   
∫
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(       ) 
 
 
∑ (
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(      ) 
(      
 
) is replaced by 
 
  (        ) 
. Therefore, (G2) becomes as 
∑
 
  (        ) 
∫      ̂( )
 
 
       
   
         
 (∫ [  (     ̅)    (     ̅)    (     ̅)    (     ̅)    ]
 
 
 ̅    ̅  ̅)  
(G3) 
Using [42, 4.337.5], (G3) is changed to (40). 
 
APPENDIX H: 
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Since      , denominator is positive. The numerator is equal to                (       
 ) 
because      
  . Since  ,   and    are positive,    is monotonically increasing by   when    
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